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NOTES

be rebutted by evidence that the user was permissive at its inception. 22
Permission is used here in the sense that the parties concerned recognize
that the owner of the servient tenement retains the right to terminate the
user at his will. Third, that a presumption of a grant can also rest upon
claim of right which is founded in oral permission to use the land as if
legally conveyed; 23 that is to say permission by which the landowner
indicates consent for a user for an unlimited period. Fourth, where permission by the landowner to use his property results in a substantial expenditure on improvements upon the faith of such permission and irrevocable license may be established. 24 The circumstances that will make it
inequitable to revoke the permission will depend upon the particular
25
case.
The type of situation which appears most likely to raise a problem in
this state today is that in which the question arises as to whether the use
was merely a matter of neighborly accommodation or under an adverse
claim, or as it may otherwise be expressed, whether among neighbors use
alone is enough to indicate such an appropriation as to raise a presumption
of adverse use, and thus establish correlatively the foundation for presumption of a lost grant. It should be remembered that the Wyoming court in
a similar situation 26 treated the nature of the user as a question of fact
for the trial court to decide from the relationship of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances.
ARNOLD B. TSCHIRGI

SURVIVORSHIP IN

THE PROCEEDS OF A SALE OF

JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY
So much property is owned by persons holding it in joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entireties that it seems desirable to review some of the ways
in which courts treat the survivorship feature when the property is sold.
This discussion is concerned with the situation which presents itself when
property1 owned in either of these ways is sold voluntarily or involuntarily
and the purchase price is not paid until after the death of one of the joint
vendors. There are two possibilities as to whom the vendee owes the unpaid portion of the purchase price: (1) He owes it all to the surviving
vendor, on the theory that the survivorship feature was retained as to the
contract of sale; (2) He owes it half to the survivor and half to the estate
of the deceased, on the theory tLat the sale terminated the joint tenancy or
22.

Kammerzell v. Anderson, 69 Wyo. 252, 240 P.2d 893 (1952).

23.
24.

Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 121 Pac. 522, 531 (1912).
Coumas v. Transcontinental Garage Inc., 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748, 41 A.L.R.2d
539 (1951).
Ibid.
Kammerzell v. Anderson, 69 Wyo. 252, 240 P.2d 893 (1952).

25.
26.
1.

For the purposes of this note it should be assumed that it will make no difference
whether the property being discussed is real or personal. If that distinction is
relevant, it will be noted.
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tenacy by the entireties and destroyed the survivorship, thus causing the
parties to hold the contract of sale as tenants in common.
One of the most important considerations in the case of voluntary
sales, has been to determine the intent of the parties with respect to how
they desire to hold the contract of sale when this intent is not expressed in
the contract. Various methods of finding this intent have been used by
the courts. One approach has been to consider the silence of the vendors
as to form of ownership in the sale contract as an indication of an intent
to extinguish the survivorship feature and to hold the contract as tenants
in common. 2 This conclusion has been reached on the theory that
creation of a joint tenancy is a matter of contract3 and hence a clear
expression of intent is necessary to create this form of ownership.4 On
the other hand, silence of the vendors has been regarded as indicative of
their intent to retain the survivorship feature in the contract of sale. The
ground for this decision 5 was that since the parties has held the property
as tenants by the entireties and failed to indicate a contrary purpose as to
the proceeds of the sale of the property, they must have intended to hold
those proceeds in the same manner as the property had been held.
If the joint owners enter into some type of collateral agreement, the
terms of which are inconsistent with an intent to hold the property in joint
tenancy or by the entireties, the effect of such an agreement is to strongly
indicate an intention to terminate the tenancy and destroy the survivorship.6 Thus, an actual agreement can end the joint tenancy or tenancy by
entireties. But the execution of a formal agreement, written or otherwise,
by the parties is not essential. The requisite intent can be found from
conduct or a course of dealing which tends to indicate the parties treat their
property as being held in tenancy in common.?
Some courts have denied the continuation of the joint tenancy as a
result of the conveyance. Inasmuch as it is unanimously held that a conveyance or sale by one or fewer than all joint tenants terminates the joint
tenancy and destroys the right of survivorship, s these cases use the statement
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252, 258 (1954).
E.g., Sanderson v. Everson, 93 Neb. 606, 141 N.W. 1025, 1026 (1913).
DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1956); In re Horn's Estate,
102 Cal.App.2d 622, 228 P.2d 99, 102 (1951).
Allen v. Tate, 58 Miss. 585, 588 (1881).
McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal2d 409, 101 P.2d 690 (1940). Joint tenants (husband
and wife) contracted in a property settlement that property they held as joint
tenants should go to their daughter, upon the death of either, rather than to the
survivor. This was held to destroy the joint tenancy. As to tenancy by the entireties, see Runco v. Ostroski, 361 Pa. 593, 65 A.2d 399, 8 A.L.R.2d 630 (1949).
Lagar v. Erickson, 13 CalApp.2d 365, 56 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1936). One joint tenant
made a testamentary disposition inconsistent with a joint tenancy. It being a question of fact whether this indicated the parties' intent to end the joint tenancy, and
the trial court having so found, the appellate court affirmed.
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086, 1090 (1956); the
statement, "A conveyance terminates a joint tenancy" is cited with approval in
In re Heckmann's Estate, 288 Iowa 967, 291 N.W. 465, 468 (1940), but the decision
was not based on this rule. However, a conveyance by fewer than all joint tenants

must cause severance because after such a conveyance the owners of the property
no longer hold their interests by the same title.

NOTES

"a conveyance terminates a joint tenancy" as authority for the holding that
a conveyance by all joint tenants terminates the joint tenancy.9 This
appears erroneous because the reason that termination occurs when only one
joint tenant conveys, viz., severance of at least one of the unities of time,
title, interest, or possession, does not exist when all the owners join in the
sale. The nature of their property interest may change in that as a result of
a contract the ownership extends to contractual rights in lieu of real property. The unities necessary to a joint tenancy and to a tenancy by the
entireties all exist in the contract of sale and only the subject of the
ownership is changed. Equal interests arise at the same time and from the
same instrument and are possessed equally. Although such. ownership
would be of personalty, it is commonly held that a joint tenancy can exist
in personal property, 1° as can tenancies by the entireties. 1' The Wyoming
court has apparently approved the rule that parties may contract that survivorship will attach to jointly owned personalty, 12 and in Hill v. Breenden 13 seemed to indicate that there may be a tenancy by the entireties in
personal property, but expressly avoided deciding this point. In the Hill
case, the fact situation was such that the court found it unnecessary to decide the equitable ownership of a note given to a husband and wife in
payment for property they had held by the entireties.
Another factor to be considered is that the attitudes of the courts seem
.to vary widely. Some have said that the policy of American law is opposed
to survivorship. 14 At least one case found survivorship even where the joint
estate was terminated by the sale. 15 Others have held survivorship destroyed
by a conveyance because the unity of possession was destroyed even when
the vendors retained title as security for the payment of the purchase
1
money.
If the intent of the parties is to be the controlling element, it seems
obvious that an involuntary sale should not cause a destruction of survivor9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

In re Baker's Estate, 247 Iowa 1380, 78 N.W.2d 863, 867 (1956); Buford v. Dahlke,
158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252, 256 (1954); In re Sprague's Estate, 244 Iowa 540, 57
N.W.2d 212, 215 (1953).
E.g., In re Whiteside's Estate, 159 Neb. 362, 67 N.W.2d 141, 145 (1954).
Cases recognizing estates by the entireties in personalty: Tendrich v. Tendrich, 193
F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F.Supp. 298, 300 (E.D.Pa. 1951);
Cross v. Phar, 215 Ark. 463, 221 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1949); Dodson v. National Title
Insurance Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So.2d 402, 404 (1947) ; Beard v. Beard, 185 Md. 178,
44 A.2d 469, 472 (1945); State Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Coleman, 241 Mo. 600, 240
S.W.2d 188, 189 (1951); Alcorn v. Alcorn, 364 Pa. 375, 72 A2d 96 (1950); Sloan v.
Jones, 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W.2d 506, 507 (1951).
Cases holding that no tenancy
by the entireties can exist in personal property: Able-Old Hickory Building and
Loan Ass'n. v. Polansky, 138 N.J.Eq. 232, 47 A.2d 730, 731 (1946) ; In re Eldon, 198
Misc. 531, 98 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (1950); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d
468, 470 (1947).
Hart v. Brimmer, 74 Wyo. 338, 353, 287 P.2d 638, 643 (1955).
A dictum shows
that the court assumes such a contract would be valid.
53 Wyo. 125, 79 P.2d 482 (1938).
Wyckoff v. Young Women's Christian Association, 37 N.J.Super. 274, 117 A.2d 162,
166 (1955) ; DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1956), also indicates the general disfavor of joint tenancy.
Allen v. Tate, 58 Miss. 585, 588 (1881).
E.g., Buford v. Dahlke, 158 Neb. 39, 62 N.W.2d 252 (1954).
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ship. If the sale is a result of condemnation proceedings, for example, the
proceeds awarded the owners should be held by them in the same manner
as they owned the property condemned. 17 In such a situation, the proceeds
from joint tenancy property should retain the character of the property from
which they were acquired. This seems to be the ruling most likely to give
effect to the intent of the parties. For the same reason, if the sale is the
result of a foreclosure on a mortgage of jointly owned property, any sum
realized in excess of the amount required to satisfy the debt should belong
to the mortgagors in the same manner as they previously owned the property.
Since the sale was involuntary there is no room for the inference that the
parties intended to sever the joint tenancy or the estate by the entireties,
while such an inference may be easier to draw in the case of a voluntary
sale.
It is probably more common that parties selling jointly owned property
will not express an intent as to the form of ownership by which they desire
to hold the proceeds of the sale. As pointed out above, courts have taken
different positions on how survivorship is effected by failure of the parties
to express this intent. It would seem the preferable view would be to
infer from their silence in this respect that they want to own the proceeds
in the same way they formerly owned the property. Courts should require
strong evidence of a contrary intent before holding that a sale by all
joint tenants or tenants by entireties destroys survivorship in the proceeds
of sale.
PETER J. MULVANEY

BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT LAW

Since the early part of the century, Section I of the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act' has been adopted, with some modification, in over half of
the states. 2 In 1934 Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgments
Acts which was declared constitutional four years later in the celebrated
case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth.4 The
primary object of this act, like the Uniform Act, was to provide for a speedy
and inexpensive method of adjudicating legal disputes before damage had
actually been suffered and the act was to be liberally construed to that end. 5
17.
1.

2.
3.

In re Zaring Estate, 93 Cal.App.2d 577, 209 P.2d 642 (1949).
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 9 U.L.A. 234 (1922).
Sec. I: "Courts of
record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimqd.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree."
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 25 (2d ed., 1941).
Act of March 3, 1915, c. 90, § 274 (a), 38 Stat. 956, as amended June 14, 1934, c. 512,
48 Stat. 955, 28 U.S.C.A.

4.
5.

§ 400.

300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000 (1937).
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Central R. of New Jersey, 33 F.Supp. 362 (E.D.Pa.
1940).

